Coyne's Folly
In his review of Follies of the Wise, Jerry Coyne tries to make a logical case that science and religion are wholly incompatible:
Regardless of what they say to placate the faithful, most scientists probably know in their hearts that science and religion are incompatible ways of viewing the world. Supernatural forces and events, essential aspects of most religions, play no role in science, not because we exclude them deliberately, but because they have never been a useful way to understand nature. Scientific “truths” are empirically supported observations agreed on by different observers. Religious “truths,” on the other hand, are personal, unverifiable and contested by those of different faiths. Science is nonsectarian: those who disagree on scientific issues do not blow each other up. Science encourages doubt; most religions quash it.
But religion is not completely separable from science. Virtually all religions make improbable claims that are in principle empirically testable, and thus within the domain of science: Mary, in Catholic teaching, was bodily taken to heaven, while Muhammad rode up on a white horse; and Jesus (born of a virgin) came back from the dead. None of these claims has been corroborated, and while science would never accept them as true without evidence, religion does. A mind that accepts both science and religion is thus a mind in conflict.
Except that it isn’t. Coyne is implying that science maintains that only that which science has verified is true, and that, conversely, everything which science has not verified is definitively false. Coyne writes all of this with a sort of faux too-bad shoulder-shrugging “I can’t help the truth” demeanor, but no matter how much cold-hard-truth attitude he ladles on, this is just plainly wrong. Scientific truth, it’s true, only confirms what it has verified and only denies what it has proven impossible, but it does not deny what it has not yet verified. On many claims about which it has either insufficient evidence or no ability to test empirically, it remains agnostic. What Coyne tries to paint as outright dismissal is really just a refusal (or inability) to judge.
posted by Peter @ 9/07/2006 10:56:00 PM
3 Comments:
I agree with the thrust of your post, that science and religion are not mutually exclusive, and that a mind can appreciate scientific knowledge while holding on to its firmest foundations of faiths.
But there is a tension--a conflict, in fact--if one follows both paradigms to their outer conclusions. It's not the tension Coyne mentions, which you are right to reject, but the tension you yourself cite when you say:
On many claims about which [Science] has either insufficient evidence or no ability to test empirically, it remains agnostic.
Agnostism means "as of yet, no commitment." Faith, on the other hand, is an affirmative non-rational commitment to a proposition, whether it can be proved or not. A true scientist stays uncommitted, because that freedom allows him to proceed as a scientist. A true scientist questions and doubts. Faith, true faith, does not--can not, and remain true faith.
Of course, there are scientists who have great and enduring faith. But that should be attributed to the wonders of the human mind and heart, and to their complexity. Surely not to their consistency of approach.
Not only that Peter, but as I am sure you're aware, there's plenty of scientific comment on many of the "religious claims" referenced in your quote- especially for the resurrection. I completely disagree with the notion above that "Faith... is an affirmative non-rational commitment to a proposition, whether it can be proved or not". That's a total misunderstanding of the essence of faith. A much better definition of faith would be "Acting on what one knows to be true, even when it doesn't feel true at the moment." Doubt, therefore, is an essential part of true faith.
Science is actually worse off than this discussion (and scientists in general) lets on. Science cannot prove beyond doubt than anything is true – it can merely raise the probability that a given hypothesis is true. The only empirical tool available to scientists is that of falsification, and its powers are limited to overturning hypothesis, not supporting them.
When a given hypothesis is not overturned by experimentation and that experiment is later confirmed by other scientists, the repetition does not confirm the validity of the hypothesis tested, it merely confirms the soundness of the experiment and the results. (There are deeper and thornier issues surrounding confirmation at this level as well, but those can passed over rather harmlessly at the moment.) The only way to prove a hypothesis true is conduct every possible experiment that could falsify it and have all of those experiments fail to falsify the hypothesis. In other words, a hypothesis is false if only one experiment falsifies it (or more precisely, would falsify it). Whether this type of proof is in principle possible is debatable, but there is little question that this type of proof is practically impossible.
Ultimately, science only ever arrives at a level of proof that ‘good enough’; good enough to build bridges, go to the moon, and put ever larger and shinier rims on the cars of terminally pubescent males. Science doesn’t give us truth, it gives us highly useful practical guidelines to our environment. Interestingly enough, these guidelines are accepted on far less than logical certainty. As long as there is some doubt about a hypothesis one has no justification to accept it as true; neither science or religion can get rid of all doubt and thus, at the most basic levels, both trade on faith.
Post a Comment
Subscribe to Post Comments [Atom]
<< Home